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Abstract: In this paper, we show that the certain elaborations of the French so-
ciologist Gariel Tarde may be traced throughout Schumpeter’s works. More spe-
cifically, we show that Joseph Schumpeter’s views were influenced by the French 
social philosopher and theoretician Gabriel Tarde who delivered a theory of So-
cial Evolution based on Technological Change as its driving force, closely related 
to the profiteering function of the economy. Also, we demonstrate that Tarde’s 
approach has striking similarities with the Schumpeterian vision of Economic 
Development, Change and Social Evolution. But there are similarities in their 
respective methodological approaches as well. For instance, the most striking 
similarity is that despite the importance he gave to the social stratum, Tarde, 
just like Schumpeter’s early approach, never fully admitted the determination of 
the individual’s will by the social forces. In other words, they both attempted to 
explain social evolution by means of individual initiative. At this point it should 
be mentioned that Tarde’s theory has been delivered and published about a dec-
ade before the publication of the first edition of Schumpeter’s influential Theory 
of Economic Development. In this context, much of this similarity in visions could 
be attributed to Schumpeter having carefully read Tarde and, probably, to cer-
tain common intellectual sources of influence. Part of the explanation why this 
similarity in visions has been inadequately acknowledged, so far, lies in the igno-
rance of the approaches on which Schumpeter built his treatises. In this frame-
work, after examining the affinities of Schumpeter’s work with Gabriel Tarde, it 
is evident that certain Schumpeterian elaborations appear to be less unique.  
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Joseph Alois Schumpeter is regarded as one of the most influential econo-
mists of all time who had a major impact on the development of Economics 
in the twentieth century. For instance, Haberler (1950, 1) argued that Jo-
seph Schumpeter “was one of the greatest economists of all time”. In fact, 
it is nowadays becoming increasingly evident that Joseph Schumpeter is 
among the most prominent theoreticians who will probably shape the 
thinking on economics for the next decades.  
However, important aspects of his works remain unexplored. In this 
context, Schumpeter’s affinities with other great theoreticians have been 
inadequately acknowledged, so far. Although there is no “systematic study 
of influence in the economics profession” (Leeson 1997, 637, emphasis in 
the original) there is one serious reason why studying the potential influ-
ences on Schumpeter is of great interest. Given that he was a major 
economist who wrote extensively on economic and social evolution, the 
study of his affinities with other great social philosophers and theoreti-
cians is an important key for understanding his writings.  
Affinities can be shown in many ways. One of the most common is 
when an author shows traces of the thinking or consistently uses the con-
tributions of authors in his work (Senn 2003, 142). In this sense, what 
were the affinities of Gabriel Tarde’s and Joseph Schumpeter’s ideas on 
technological change and social evolution? 
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Obviously, understanding the origins of these important ideas and 
re-evaluating the influences that might have shaped them could be very 
useful for promoting dialogue between Economics and Sociology and clari-
fying several issues. More precisely, this paper makes an attempt to inter-
pret certain parts of Joseph Schumpeter’s voluminous oeuvre in associa-
tion with the writings of the French social theoretician Gabriel Tarde. 
This article is part of a larger project investigating Joseph Alois Schum-
peter and his affinities with other great theoreticians and/or schools of 
thought (see, for instance, Michaelides and Milios 2004, 2005a, 2005b, Mi-
chaelides et al, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c).  
Following Shionoya (2005, ix), we would like to affirm the following 
thesis, which has been the point of departure of our investigation: “Even if 
the core of a certain idea were identified in the continuous and 
discontinuous process of the filiation and ramification of thought, it is still 
possible to trace its predecessors, successors, and sympathizers in 
different directions”. Of course, it is the case that tracing these paths for 
many of the economic and social theories is usually quite difficult.  
The paper is structured as follows: section two (II) offers a very brief 
biographical presentation of the two theoreticians’ life and work; section 
three (III) explores the role of technological change and development in 
their respective writings; section four (IV) presents their respective views 
on the concepts of determinism and individualism; finally, section five (V) 
concludes the paper. 
 
II. Brief Biographical Notes: Joseph Schumpeter & Gabriel Tarde 
 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), was born in the Austrian part of 
Moravia (then the Hapsburg Empire) and died in Taconic, Connecticut. He 
was educated at the Theresianum, a deeply aristocratic school where 
“Schumpeter never felt that he quite belonged” (McCraw 2007, 18). In 
1901 Schumpeter enrolled in the faculty of Law at the University of 
Vienna, and continued his studies in Berlin and London. In 1906, he took 
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the degree Doctor utriusque iuris. In 1909 Schumpeter became an 
Assistant Professor at the University of Czernowitz (Kirsch 1979, 143). 
Between 1911 and 1919 he taught Political Economy as a Full Professor in 
Graz, while in 1913 and in 1914 he was an Exchange Professor at 
Columbia University. In 1918, Schumpeter became member of the German 
Socialisation Commission (Sozialisierungskommission), and in 1919 he 
was appointed Minister of Finance in the government formed by the Social 
Democrats (Haberler 1950, 346). In 1921 he became president of 
Biederman Bank in Vienna, and in 1924 after the great inflation in 
Germany he accepted a professorship at the University of Bonn in 
Germany in 1925.1 From 1932 until his death in 1950 at the peak of his 
fame he taught at Harvard University and he served as president of the 
American Economic Association.2  
Schumpeter’s writings cover a broad range of topics such as the dy-
namics of economic and social evolution (e.g. Theory of Economic Develop-
ment, 1912, and Business Cycles, 1939), the integration of economic, socio-
logical and political perspectives with regard to capitalism (e.g. Capital-
ism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942) and, last but not least, the history of 
economic ideas (e.g. Economic Doctrine and Method, 1914, and History of 
Economic Analysis, 1954).  
On the other hand, Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) was born in Sarlat, 
Dordogne (France) where he engaged in legal studies and became Juge d’ 
instruction. He was a student of human nature who was particularly in-
terested in the explanation of motives. Very early in his career he realised 
not only that motives may be resolved in terms of belief and desire, but 
also that, under certain circumstances, they could even be “measured”, in 
                  
1 Ιn the summer of 1926, Schumpeter lost his beloved mother, his (second) wedded wife, 
and his (new born) son. Based on Schumpeter's diaries, it is often argued that his 
meticulous output was due to “isolation and self-doubt” that was enhanced by the death 
of his wife and son that made him use academic work “as a means of harnessing his 
personal grief” McCraw (2007, 345, 160). 
2 It is worth noting here that although he was world famous by that time, Schumpeter 
was also penniless. As McCraw (2007, 4) stressed, Schumpeter had to make paid 
speeches in order to be able to buy his transatlantic ticket.  
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an approach where everything is “calculable” and never unexpected.3 In 
this context, Tarde’s La croyance et le désir, possibilité de leur mésure 
(1880) in Revue Philosophique is regarded as a significant contribution in 
the literature.       
Imitation as a motive force of change attracted Tarde’s attention 
from the very beginning of his scientific endeavor. Meanwhile, he pro-
ceeded to the study of the evolutionary theory as held, for instance, by 
Darwin and Spencer, including the evolution of institutions (Giddings 
1903, iv). He noticed the overwhelming presence of imitation in most 
spheres of the human action. To a sharp philosophical mind like Tarde’s, it 
was pretty obvious that there was some sort of a broader socio-psycho-
economic immanent regularity (i.e. “law” of imitation), worth investigat-
ing. This is why Tarde is regarded as a theorist of imitation emphasizing 
invention as the driver of imitation, borrowing, thus, from Leibniz and 
Cournot a mechanical explanation of reality.  
Tarde published several articles in Revue Philosophique between 
1882 and 1884, such as Les Lois de l’imitation, Les Traits communs de la 
nature et de l’histoire, L’Archéologie et la statistique and Qu’est-ce qu’un 
société?4. Gabriel Tarde’s philosophical system is exposed in a series of lec-
tures at the Collège Libre des Sciences Sociales in 1897. These lectures 
(structured in three parts i.e. The Repetition of Phenomena, The Opposi-
tion of Phenomena and the Adaptation of Phenomena) were published un-
der the title Les Lois Sociales (1898).   
In what follows, our attempt intends only to provide an overview of 
Tarde’s influence on Schumpeter, from the theoretical and methodological 
perspective. As a result, in this paper, the connections between 
Schumpeter and Tarde are sometimes primarily substantive (as in the 
section on Technological Change, etc) and sometimes primarily 
methodological in nature (as in the section on Individualism, etc). 
                  
3 This discovery had been made before the seminal contributions by Bentham, Cournot, 
Menger, Walras and Jevons. 
4 Other articles setting forth the same underlying principles and formulating ideas 
shaped by the Tarde’s professional experience were later integrated in his 1891 books La 
criminalité comparée and La philosophie pénale (Giddings 1903).   
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III. Technological Change and Development  
 
Gabriel Tarde was a visionary social philosopher. In a lecture given to the 
Society of Sociology in Paris (June 11, 1902) he made a serious attempt to 
explain social evolution. According to Tarde successful initiatives signify 
the drivers of social evolution. The direction of the evolutionary path de-
pends on small insignificant (on their own) random forces, which are com-
bined with new forces creating, thus, a new sort of periodical reproduction 
of the system. In his own words: “In all theses instances it is seen that 
great, constant forces are given a direction by small, accidental, new 
forces, which, by being grafted on the first ones, set into motion a new 
kind of a periodic reproduction. Upon repetitions is grafted a variation, 
origin of new variations” (Tarde 1902, 1).  
Furthermore, evolution and change is made possible through inven-
tion based on repetition. Repetition consists of elements such as the cli-
mate, the sun, the race, as well as by tradition, custom, ideas, and ac-
quired attitudes. In fact, climate and race are characterised by periodical 
movements (tide-winds and successive hereditary generations of the same 
race, respectively, etc), whereas, tradition, custom and ideas, are charac-
terised by imitative repetitions, transmissions of examples.  According to 
Tarde (1902, 1) : “social transformations are explained by the individual 
initiatives which are imitated, I do not say that invention, successful ini-
tiative, is the only acting force, nor do I say that it is actually the strongest 
force, but I say that it is the directing, determining, and explaining force”.  
This argument reminds us strongly of Schumpeter whose work is “a 
comment, from constantly varying viewpoints, on a single affirmation: 
every aspect of social life is continually being transformed under capital-
ism” (de Vecchi 1995, 3). For Schumpeter development is mostly the result 
of innovation, i.e. “the outstanding fact in the economic history of capital-
ist society” (Schumpeter 1939, 61). For him, innovation is the leading force 
in what he calls “evolution”. Evolution is however discontinuous because of 
a discontinuity in the introduction of major innovations into the economic 
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system. However, Schumpeter’s concept of innovation was different than 
what is generally assumed because he stressed that innovation per se is 
not a force in economic development. Rather, the real force in economic 
development is the consequences of these innovations (Schumpeter 1928). 
These consequences make innovations a force in the economic sys-
tem and innovations which do not produce these consequences cannot be a 
force in the economic evolution of a social formation. According to Schum-
peter, development depends primarily upon productivity increases based 
on innovation. More precisely, for Schumpeter this concept covered the fol-
lowing cases: “1. The introduction of a new good […] or a new quality of a 
good. 2. The introduction of a new method of production […]. 3. The open-
ing of a new market […]. 4. The conquest of a new source of supply […]. 5.  
The carrying out of the new organisation of any industry” (Schumpeter 
1912, 66). In this spirit the great Austrian thinker Joseph Schumpeter 
used the term ‘technological progress’ to characterize the changes (Scherer 
1992, 1417), which account for the greater part of economic development. 
Of course, the hero of his story was the entrepreneur who initiated 
change. In other words, in the Schumpeterian evolution begins when an 
exceptional entrepreneur introduces an innovation. Actually, innovations 
produce qualitative changes in the system: “[The] historic and irreversible 
changes in the way of doing things we call “innovation” and we define: in-
novations are changes in production functions which cannot be decom-
posed into infinitesimal steps” (Schumpeter 1935, 4). In fact, Schumpeter 
defined economic development as “such changes in economic life as are not 
forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative, from within” 
(Schumpeter 1912, 63). According to Schumpeter, economic development is 
accompanied by growth, i.e. sustained increases in national income; how-
ever, quantitative growth does not constitute development per se. He 
wrote: “[W]hat we are about to consider is that kind of change arising from 
[…] the system which so displaces its equilibrium point that the new one 
cannot be reached from the old one by infinitesimal steps. Add successively 
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as many coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby” 
(Schumpeter 1912, 64, emphasis added).   
Tarde suggested that by placing ourselves in a society already or-
ganized and alive, having its own language, a political and economic re-
gime in embryonic form, as well as customs and habits we are in a position 
to examine the origins of modern society; we are about to examine why 
and how its language or the government, religion, morality, art and other 
beliefs could be modified in a given moment. “The only means that could 
clarify the problem of origins, in all aspects, is to place ourselves, from the 
beginning, in medias res and to seize the action of forces that later could 
serve to explain the formation of things, the transformation of which they 
primarily explain” (Tarde 1902, 2). 
In Tarde’s analysis, we may detect a fundamental element of 
Schumpeter’s idea on the conflict between routine and innovation, charac-
terising the circular flow. In a similar to Tarde’s vein, Schumpeter started 
all his analyses with a treatise which, excluding any innovative activities, 
led to a stationary state. The stationary state is, described by Walrasian 
equilibrium taking account of the interdependences of economic variables 
but applicable only to a stationary process, i.e. one which adapted itself to 
forces acting on it. However, just like Tarde implied too, the examination 
of a static system is not worthless because in the short-run, when most of 
the dynamic factors can be considered as being fixed, it is not devoid of ex-
planatory power.  
In Schumpeter’s  (1939, 40-41) words: “‘we may thus visualize an 
economic process which merely reproduces itself at constant rates; a given 
population, not changing in either numbers or age distribution […] the 
tastes (wants) of households are given and do not change. The ways of 
production and usages of commerce are optimal from the standpoint of the 
firm’s interest and with respect to existing horizons and possibilities hence 
do not change either, unless some datum changes or some chance event 
intrudes upon this world.  
13th International Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, Thessaloniki, April 23-26, 2009 
 
 10
No other than ordinary routine work has to be done in this station-
ary society, either by workmen or managers. Beyond this there is, in fact, 
no managerial function – nothing that calls for the special type of activity 
which we associate with the entrepreneur […] Such a process would turn 
out, year after year, the same kinds, qualities and quantities of consumers’ 
and producers’ goods; every firm would employ the same kind and quanti-
ties of productive goods and services; finally, all theses goods would be 
brought and sold at the same prices year after year” (Schumpeter, 1939, 
40-41). 
The author stated that the mechanistic repetition of acts -which 
reminds us of Tarde’s mechanistic approach based on Cournot and Leib-
nitz -was based on the accumulated experience of man (Schumpeter 1934, 
84-85): The entrepreneurs took the same decisions. The income was paid 
to consumer goods already produced. Any supply was counterbalanced by 
its own demand at the level of prices which covered the unit cost. Money 
could be absent without deforming the economic phenomena. Apparently, 
the economic stratum could only alter under pressure. Schumpeter de-
scribed this equilibrium as “stationary flow” (Schumpeter 1912, ch. 1) 
characterized by the absence of any change. He made clear that this “sta-
tionary flow” is only a theoretical abstraction and serves as a reference 
point (Schumpeter 1928). Yet, while Schumpeter was a great admirer of 
Walras’s scientific method and technique, he believed that this vision of 
the economy was incomplete in that there should be a source of movement 
within the economic system, i.e. innovation.  
Tarde proceeded further in search of the laws of invention and indi-
vidual innovation. He distinguished between theoretical and practical in-
ventions:  
 Theoretical inventions: Mythological conceptions, Philosophical sys-
tems, Hypotheses, Scientific discoveries. 
 Practical inventions: Verbal innovations (neologisms), ritual innova-
tions, industrial innovations, military innovations, political innova-
tions, judiciary innovations, artistic and literary innovations. 
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Theoretical innovations make their appearance, logically and chrono-
logically, before the practical ones. Another interesting distinction was 
that there are inventions that cannot possibly be substituted, while others 
that can be substituted. Analytically, only the theoretical (e.g. scientific) 
discoveries cannot be substituted; the practical (e.g. industrial) inventions 
are often replaced (Tarde 1902, 4). 
Tarde emphasized the fact that inventions come from a new combi-
nation of already existing resources and concepts, i.e. from imitation. 
“Every machine consists of old tools, old methods, combined in a different 
way” (Tarde 1902, 5, emphasis added). In this context, Tarde believed that 
even the most genius poet or artist does nothing more than combine in a 
different way the processes already known, ancient rhythms and rimes, 
and provides his personal stamp in expressing his sentiments or ideas 
that are as old as the world itself: “The most genial among the poets and 
artists combines in a different way previously known art, methods, com-
bined in a different way” (Tarde 1902, 8, emphasis added).  
 Tarde concluded that the great poets (like Hugo and de Lamartine) 
had been inventors and creators because, although they originally imi-
tated, they knew how to turn the innumerable examples they had in 
hands into a nice new output based on existing realities (Tarde 1902, 8).5  
In any case, invention consists of a work of logic and teleology: it is 
judgment, reasoning, deduction and adaptation. Of course, “At the source 
                  
5 The difference between the scientific and the artistic, aesthetic invention is that in the 
first case the state of mind of the inventor plays a secondary part and the objective ele-
ment keeps the dominant part, whereas it’s inversed for the second case. Nevertheless, in 
both cases the indispensable condition is the encounter of the ‘imitative rays’ (rayons imi-
tatifs according to Tarde’s expression) within the minds, impressed in a certain manner 
by the external environment, the nature. Thanks to this direct and brilliant contact with 
the nature, two known ideas, that until then seemed having nothing to share, appear as 
attached with each other by a liaison of a consequence principle or by a liaison of means 
to an end or different means to a common end. Newton, e.g., conceived the fall of a body 
and the Lune’s gravity around Earth as two identical phenomena, consequences of the 
same principle, i.e. the universal attraction. By seeing the magnetic needle’s deviation H. 
C. Oerstedt and A.-M. Ampère conceived magnetism and electricity like two variables of a 
common force, and this discovery that identified two forces until then considered as 
stranger to one-an-other was enough to produce later the invention of the electric tele-
graph when it was combined within other brilliant minds with the already ancient need 
of long distance mental communication and it seemed to them as the best way of achiev-
ing this goal. 
13th International Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, Thessaloniki, April 23-26, 2009 
 
 12
of a new invention there is something else than just combined imitations 
of prior inventions. There is the main originality of this combination” 
(Tarde 1902, 6). Without this “there would be no change in the channels of 
the flow (from the same to the same) no change in the production function 
(from equations to equations)” (Taymans 1950, 618). The innovating forces 
are also new to the extent that they are grafted upon the old ones (Tarde 
1902, 1).     
Joseph Schumpeter distinguished the process of development from 
growth due to the gradual increase in population and capital and - in a 
strikingly similar to Tarde spirit - wrote: “The slow and continuous in-
crease in time of the national supply of productive means and of savings is 
obviously an important factor in explaining the course of economic history 
through centuries, but it is completely overshadowed by the fact that de-
velopment consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different 
way, in doing new things with them, irrespective of whether those re-
sources increase or not” (Schumpeter 1942, 65, emphasis added). 
He wrote: “Carrying out a new plan and acting according to a cus-
tomary one are things as different as making a road and walking along it” 
(Schumpeter 1912, 85). In this spirit, as is well know he labelled the carry-
ing out of new combinations “enterprise” and the individuals who carried 
them out “entrepreneurs”, whereas “entrepreneurs” cannot simply do this 
when they are confronted by new tasks because while in the accustomed 
channels their own ability and experience suffice, when confronted with 
innovations, they need guidance (Schumpeter 1912, 79–80). In another 
formulation, while they are obliged to swim with the stream in the circular 
flow, they have to make an effort to swim against the stream if they wish 
to change its channel (Prendergast 2006, 255). Thus, “It follows that nov-
elty needs to be forced upon the majority of economic agents, as progress 
in general is basically a result of force and confrontation” (Ebner 2006, 
504).  
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Schumpeter defined production as the combinations or materials 
and forces that are within our reach (Schumpeter 1942, 65). However, in 
the general case, the producer is not an inventor. Following Scott’s formu-
lation: “Schumpeter emphasized the role of the entrepreneur in develop-
ment. By definition, he is the man who sees that the new combination is 
made. He is to be distinguished from the capitalist (who bears the risk) 
and from the inventor (who has the ideas), although it is possible for one 
man to be all three” (Scott 1989, p. 104). 
Apparently, based on the aforementioned Schumpeterian analysis it 
could be argued that nobody (not even Schumpeter himself) would proba-
bly mind too much the use of “invention”, instead of “innovation” as refer-
ring to the ultimate cause of evolution given that this is exactly what 
Tarde meant by the term “invention”. After all, the term “innovation” first 
appeared in Schumpeter’s oeuvre in 1927 (Taymans 1950).  
 
IV. Determinism, Individualism and Development  
 
According to Tarde’s analysis the evolutionary path depends on 
small insignificant (on their own) random forces, which are combined with 
new forces creating, thus, a new sort of periodical reproduction of the sys-
tem. In his own words: “In all theses instances it is seen that great, con-
stant forces are given a direction by small, accidental, new forces, which, 
by being grafted on the first ones, set into motion a new kind of a periodic 
reproduction. Upon repetitions is grafted a variation, origin of new varia-
tions” (Tarde 1902, 1, emphasis added).6    
                  
6Given a group of brains in mental contact, when one of them conceives an idea or a new 
action, and when this idea or action seems to be of superior quality, it will certainly com-
municate itself to three, four, ten persons around; and each of them, in turn, will spread 
it around him, and so on until the limits of the group are reached. This will at least be the 
tendency, although often stopped by obstacles or contradictory tendencies (Tarde 1902b, 
vol. 1, 23-24). In a footnote to this passage Tarde raised the question of the determination 
of the limits of the groups; he refereed to the multiplicity of esprits de corps – religious, 
political, professional, domestic, national - which rather limit the spread of both ideas 
and action (Hughes 1961, 556).       
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We need to clearly see that all social phenomena have as their ele-
mentary causes inter-corporal and inter-mental actions, embraced by soci-
ology in their complex totality of these two sorts of actions, but also that 
inter-mental actions explain the inter-corporal ones and allow for the for-
mulation of general sociological laws. 
The directing forces are, therefore, accidental; they are not “mea-
surable” (calculables) and they are not automatically produced by a num-
ber of circumstances. The innovator/inventor does not behave under a giv-
en pattern of methods. His adaptive behaviour that consists of a reaction 
to a given set of conditions proceeds by a causal connection determined 
and described by theory (Taymans 1950, 619).  
 Does Trade exaggerate when emphasizing on the “accidental”? If 
each invention taken separately is accidental, if we always have the right 
to say that it could emerge too soon or too late and in a different part of 
the world, it is not less true to claim that the ensemble of their sequence is 
regulated by general laws, the ones relative to the probability of the inven-
tions. These laws had been a constant pursuit and intent for Tarde.7 He 
had conceived a complete philosophy of phenomenal existence and he ra-
pidly converted it into literary embodiment.8 
Every invention profoundly is a judgement, the reunion of two 
terms by copulation. And this consists of the elementary and necessary 
step the spirit must take. There isn’t but a single line, a unique series of 
inventions carried out by a logical deduction: there are, beginning from 
each invention, millions of following possible inventions, but not all of 
these being materialized; just few of them (Tarde 1902, 10).  
If we wish to understand the linear series of the real inventions we 
should also take into account the set of all possible inventions. “Real is 
                  
7 The first edition of his famous Les lois de l’ imitation appeared in 1890 and a second in 
1895.   
8 In relation to total inventions Tarde refers to Bréal’s Semantics, a French-Jewish phi-
lologist, born in Bavaria who is often considered as the founder of modern seman-
tics. Who invents the new meaning instantly forgets the antecedent meanings, except one 
single, of the fact that the association of ideas always come in twosomes (couples) (Tarde 
1902, 6).  
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nothing but a case of possible; and it is not only in mathematics that the 
calculation of the imaginary quantities is necessary for the calculation of 
real quantities. All discoveries carry the infinity of other discoveries with-
in their folds, but not all of them come out of it” (Tarde 1902, 10). It is im-
portant to consider all possibilities that led to an abortion, so that we 
avoid committing the vulgar error of believing in single-linear formulas of 
social evolution.9    
Furthermore, evolution and change is made possible through indi-
vidual invention based on repetition: “social transformations are explained 
by the individual initiatives which are imitated, I do not say that inven-
tion, successful initiative, is the only acting force, nor do I say that it is ac-
tually the strongest force, but I say that it is the directing, determining, 
and explaining force” Tarde (1902, 1). 
The individual creator owes to society and social collaboration even 
his brightest individual creation. Societal is, according to Tarde, nothing 
more than the accumulated individual (Tarde 1902, 6). Thanks to the im-
itative diffusion the superior or singular individual is not working but for 
the collectivity where it belongs. The main part of the individual tends to 
collectivize, to socialize (Tarde 1902, 11). Will there ever be an increasing-
ly declining need for the necessity of superior individuals? Tarde’s reply is 
negative since the easier inventions are the ones to emerge first, providing 
an explanation of why there are inventions (innovations) that appeared 
                  
9 “For an invention M to bloom” we should keep in mind that the elementary inventions 
A, B, C …, and so on, should have been previously effectuated since they consist of the 
combinatory accessories and parts contributing to the invention of M. Therefore, the im-
itative propagation of A, B, C should have been rapid and spread on a vast territory and 
in a dense population; furthermore it should have the chances that their rays interfere 
within the willing mind. On the other hand, with a given certain field of expansion of 
these elementary inventions, the more the race is fertile in individual varieties, in indi-
vidual profound and outstanding inequalities, thanks to crossbreeding, intermarriages, 
the more there will be chances that the brain singularity required by the fruitful combi-
nation of the imitative rays A, B, C…and so on, is materialised and in turn materialises 
this combination” (Tarde 1902, 2). Clearly thus, the change is due to the innovator, i.e. 
the inventor.  
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simultaneously in the past, independently the one from the other in vari-
ous parts of the world (Tarde 1902, 11).10    
These discoveries, according to Tarde, are made by individuals and 
these discoveries are interconnected and philosophically interwoven, with 
other individuals. In fact, what makes the world go round, according to 
Tarde, in not great men, but rather great thoughts. For instance, some of 
the most significant discoveries in mathematics and science such as the 
concept of “zero”, are anonymous, originating in very obscure individual 
personalities (Tarde 1902, 3). But this might be considered as a very su-
perficial perspective of reality.   
 In The Laws of Imitation he endeavoured to point out in all possible 
clarity the purely social aspect of most human phenomena, as distinct 
from their vital and physical characteristics. Tarde claimed that the laws 
of a pure sociology apply to every society, past, present or future just as 
the laws of general physiology apply to all species, living, extinct or imagi-
nary (Tarde 1903, ix-x). Tarde was accused of Psychologism because he 
built several of his analyses on the psychology of the individual. Most 
economists and sociologists were unwilling to accept his attempts to con-
struct a social science on what went on in the (individual) human mind.11  
On this subject, Schumpeter shares several common insights with 
Tarde. As is well known, in the second edition of Theory of Economic De-
                  
10 As societies facilitate the imitative expansion of ancient inventions, the difficulty of 
new inventions becomes harder, due to the same reason that, in the same way of quarry-
ing a single mine, the extraction of new fossil becomes harder to attain (Tarde 1902, 12).  
11 In this context, Tarde’s La Psychologie économique was not well received by most 
economists, whereas sociologists had mixed feelings about it. For instance, the Revue Phi-
losophique published two critical reviews, one by an economist and the other by a sociolo-
gist. The Belgian economist Mahaim (1903) criticised La psychologie économique in 
Charles Gide’s Revue d’économie politique. In particular, he eulogized Tarde’s elaboration 
of the concept of need (besoin) as the desire of something believed to be part of our well 
being. However, he raised serious objections to Tarde’s definition of capital even though 
he admired the theoretical construction behind it. In this spirit, Mahaim, argued that 
Tarde greatly exaggerates the role of individual psychology and knowledge in relation to 
material things and his critique of the economic theories of capital, based on the relevant 
concepts, were not to the point. This was so, because knowledge was implicitly incorpo-
rated in economic theory in labor as a factor of production (Mahaim, 1903, 24–25). Anglo-
Saxon economists who read the French text rejected Tarde’s criticism of the economic 
man and concluded that there was no need to revise economic theory on the basis of his 
thinking (Davis 1902; Hamilton 1903; Veblen 1902).  
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velopment where Schumpeter omitted the seventh chapter and rewrote the 
second, several writers, such as Shionoya 1997, 167–71, argued that the 
changes detected signify a shift of emphasis (or a paradigm shift) with re-
gard to entrepreneurial leadership in the Schumpeterian oeuvre.  
More precisely, in the first edition, the entrepreneurial leader was 
described as dynamic man, and the concepts of innovation and credit were 
introduced as the form of economic development and its means, respec-
tively (Prendergast 2006, 259). In other words, in his early writings 
Schumpeter advocated “methodological individualism” (Shionoya 1990, 
202), which gave priority to an atomistic view of society over a holistic one. 
For Schumpeter (1908, 91) who originally coined the term, methodological 
individualism “just means that one starts from the individual in order to 
describe certain economic relationships”. Of course, according to Hodgson 
(2007), methodological individualism is neither a universal principle of so-
cial science nor an obligatory rule for all social scientists According to the 
same author, Schumpeter (1954, 888) invented the term “sociological indi-
vidualism” to describe “the doctrine that the self-governing individual con-
stitutes the ultimate unit of the social sciences”. Regardless of the fact 
that there is no broad consensus on the sense and usage of “methodologi-
cal individualism”, the term “sociological individualism” coincides with 
what many theoreticians, nowadays, describe as “methodological individu-
alism” (Hodgson 2007).  
In the second edition of Theory of Economic Development, the im-
portance of the entrepreneurial leader was reduced. In fact, Schumpeter in 
his mature works changed considerably his conception of innovative activ-
ity and leadership (see, among others, Swedberg 1991, 172–3; Prender-
gast, 2006, 261). A major manifestation of this shift is the fact that in his 
Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial History, Schumpeter (1949, 51) was 
sincere enough to admit that “the entrepreneurial function need not be 
embodied in a physical person and in particular in a single physical per-
son”. 
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According to Schumpeter, individualist initiative was necessary for 
social evolution and economic development. In fact, in 1910, Schumpeter 
had already stressed emphatically, contrary to established theoreticians, 
that the “herd of consumers” needed to be “mastered and guided” by the 
“leading personalities” of the production sphere (Schumpeter 1910, 51). In 
this context, “[L]eadership […] does not consist simply in finding or creat-
ing the new thing but in so impressing the social group with it as to draw 
it on in its wake” (Schumpeter 1912, 88). Here, we stress the fact that for 
Schumpeter, economic development involved a process of creative destruc-
tion in which a special kind of action was necessary to initiate change. In 
Schumpeter’s own words entrepreneurship is “essentially a phenomenon 
that comes under the wider aspect of leadership” (Clemence 1951, 254–5). 
 As is well known, according to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur was 
motivated by : (a) “the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, 
usually, though not necessarily, also a dynasty” (Schumpeter 1934, 93); (b) 
‘”the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to oth-
ers, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success it-
self” (Schumpeter 1934, 93); (c) the joy of creating, of getting things done, 
or simply of exercising one’s energy and ingenuity (Schumpeter 1934, 93). 
In other words, entrepreneurial profits are viewed as means to achieve 
further ends and, thus, “entrepreneurship is driven by motivations that 
are alien to the rationalist foundations of capitalist civilisation” (Ebner 
2006, 504). Moreover, according to the same author (Ebner 2006, 504), for 
Schumpeter the motives of ordinary economic agents in the circular flow 
“were not based on rational choice and egoistic hedonism, but on habits 
that were meant to satisfy given wants that are also shaped by the social 
environment”. 
In his mature work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Schum-
peter took a very different view. In fact, he argued that capitalism would 
be “killed” by a hostile atmosphere to its own social order and – surpris-
ingly enough - not by economic failure. In fact, Schumpeter claimed that 
the bureaucratisation of the big enterprise, with the transformation of en-
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trepreneurial activity into a routine process conducted by managers and 
technical employees, would lead to the final decline of the big enterprise 
and thus of the capitalist economic order.  
For Schumpeter the entrepreneurs constantly renewed the capital-
ist class, as the more successful among them systematically showed the 
propensity of becoming capitalist-owners themselves (Schumpeter 1912, 
78-9). Only the bureaucratisation of the big enterprise, through the subor-
dination of the entrepreneurs to managers, could lead trustified capitalism 
to socialism: ‘The perfectly bureaucratized giant industrial unit […] ousts 
the entrepreneur and expropriates the bourgeoisie as a class which in the 
process stands to lose not only its income but what is infinitely more im-
portant, its function’ (Schumpeter 1942, 134). “Thus the same process that 
undermines the position of the bourgeoisie by decreasing the importance 
of the functions of entrepreneurs and capitalists, by breaking up protective 
strata and institutions, by creating an atmosphere of hostility, also de-
composes the motor forces of capitalism from within” (Schumpeter 1942, 
161-62). 
Schumpeter defined socialism as “an institutional arrangement that 
vests the management of the productive forces with some public authority” 
(Schumpeter 1942, 113), and claimed that “the modern corporation […] so-
cializes the […] mind”’ (Schumpeter 1942, 156). Furthermore, he argued 
that the “bureaucratisation of economic life” (Schumpeter 1942, 206) al-
lows the transition to a socialist but “bureaucratic apparatus” by estab-
lishing new modes of managerial responsibility and selection that “could 
only be reproduced in a socialist society” (Schumpeter 1942, 206-7). 
In simple words, a basic argument of Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy is that the entrepreneur becomes less and less important, and 
consequently the process of economic development comes to halt and capi-
talism gives way to socialism. Schumpeter gave two reasons for the grad-
ual disappearance of the entrepreneur: “For, on the one hand, it is much 
easier now than it has been in the past to do things that lie outside the 
familiar routine – innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Techno-
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logical progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained 
specialists who turn out what is required and make it work unpredictable 
ways. The romance of earlier commercial venture is rapidly wearing away, 
because so many more things can be strictly calculated that had of old to 
be visualized in a flash of genius. On the other hand, personality and will 
power must count for less in environments which have become accustomed 
to economic change – best instanced by an incessant stream of new con-
sumer’s and producer’s goods – and which, instead of resisting, accept it a 
matter of course” (Schumpeter 1942, 132).  
Besides a less individualistic approach to the concept of entrepre-
neurial leadership (Schumpeter 1951, 153), Schumpeter’s late writings 
seem to admit the limits that social reality imposes on the leader’s activ-
ity, a thing which shows that, for Schumpeter, the choices open to indi-
viduals are indeed limited and, it is in this spirit, that his mature writings 
revealed this awareness that society moves of its own momentum and that 
leaders are largely constrained by the existing social stratum (Prender-
gast, 2006, 261).  
However, Schumpeter still stressed the importance of individual en-
trepreneurs, albeit in a different institutional setting: e.g. a production 
engineer in the R&D department of a large firm could be regarded as an 
“entrepreneur” in Schumpeter’s sense of the word. Thus, despite envisag-
ing the demise of the entrepreneurs and their partial replacement by a 
new mode of economic organization, he never abandoned his initial model 
of the entrepreneur as the agent of change (te Velde 2001, 24).  
 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
          
To sum up, it is surprising that extremely limited attention has been paid 
to Gabriel Tarde as an intellectual source for Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 
given the presence of central elements of the flamboyant economist’s 
vision in the works of the French sociologist. This paper argued that 
Schumpeter formulated some of his principal theses in accordance with 
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the conceptual framework of Gabriel Tarde, given that the parallels are 
undeniable, and the matching of certain concepts impressive.  
Analytically, strong parallels were found with respect to forces 
driving the evolution of the system and the role of technology. Also, we 
compared Tarde’s and Schumpeter’s visions emphasising the role of the 
‘entrepreneur’, and the ‘stationary state’. Finally, Schumpeter’s 
‘entrepreneur’ was viewed in the context of the Tardian approach of 
‘individualism’ stressing the inevitability of ‘socialism’.  
Furthermore, Tarde focused, among other things, on the fundamen-
tal role of Psychology, looking for the consequences at the societal level, of 
psychological phenomena observed at the individual level, thus bridging 
the gap between macro- and micro-level problems. In an attempt that re-
minds us of the German Historical School, Tarde built a system that he 
saw as applicable to all social sciences, but he was realist enough to see 
that this was practically impossible. His ideas were germinal and sugges-
tive but needed more cultivation. His dealing with Economics was practi-
cally an extension of his ideas on societal structure to political economy.12 
Tarde thought that Economics did not furnish solutions to many of 
the current problems of population growth, employment or migration. The 
main reason for the inadequacy of economic theory was its basis on Psy-
chology with a strong preference for simple hedonic calculus. For instance, 
in his Psychologie économique (1902b, 119-121) Tarde claimed that leisure 
and the consumption of goods go hand in hand; and not merely that goods 
are consumed in time of leisure but also that in leisure there often occurs 
a “conversation of brains” (minds) out of which new wants and desires 
emerge (Hughes 1961, 557).  
Economic theory at the end of the 19th century was discovering sub-
jective utility which Tarde advocated. By some economists he was recog-
nized as one of the early promoters of the concept. However, they hardly 
ever appreciated the fact that Tarde attempted to explain subjective util-
                  
12 In the 19th c., social scientists felt that the new capitalist society brought problems that 
had to be dealt with in new ways and that this was the responsibility of the social scien-
tists, i.e. of political economists and sociologists.  
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ity by means of a motivational conflict theory, involving beliefs and desires 
(Roche-Agussol, 1926).  
What has survived nowadays of Tarde’s ideas is probably related to 
the imitative use of invention. Tarde’s influence on modern research on 
the diffusion of innovation is recognized by many authors in the field 
(Rogers, 1962; Kinnunen, 1996; Katz, 1999, Wärneryd, 2008). Katz (1999) 
complained that the diffusion of innovation research no longer had any 
theory that, like the one developed by Tarde, could bridge the theoretical 
disciplines involved.  
Despite Schumpeter’s early romantic dream of developing what he 
called an “exact economics” (McCraw 2007, 5), it is true that the basic dif-
ferences between Schumpeter and Tarde, on the one hand, and other great 
economists and sociologists, on the other hand, go much deeper than plain 
and simple mathematical theorems and other technicalities. They saw a 
different economic and social reality. Both men argued that a modern 
socio-economic system is always in (dis)equilibrium in the sense that it is 
forever changing and is rather open than closed in nature and constantly 
interacting with societal and even physiological factors. Of course, such an 
approach to reality is mostly ignored, in large part because it is too diffi-
cult to formalize, i.e. to fit into the maximization paradigm that dominates 
Economics as a science (McCraw 2007, 500). 
Meanwhile, most classical economics and social philosophers con-
sidered innovations to be an “exogenous factor”, which have profound in-
fluence on the economy as a whole but are not part of Economics as a sci-
ence. However, Schumpeter and Tarde argued that innovation and inven-
tion, respectively, is the very essence of the socio-economic system which 
led to their perception as the subject of economics and social evolution.  
To conclude, we may say that, based on the available material and 
given the profound similarities in their respective theses, the fact that 
Tarde was Schumpeter’s senior by forty years and the fact that he died 
(after having published all of his important works) just three year after 
Schumpeter had enrolled in the faculty of Law at the University of Vi-
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enna, are clear evidence that Tarde influenced the great Austrian theore-
tician. After all, Schumpeter’s reading of Tarde coincided – chronologically 
– with a period when Schumpeter was formulating his own theoretical 
system (Haberler 1950; Smithies 1951; Faltello and Jovanovic 1997).   
Here, one must face two important issues:  
(a) Why were Tarde’s ideas not influential in Economics? According to Ve-
blen’s (1902) intriguing explanation: The author’s familiarity with econom-
ics is patently scanty, and has a perfunctory air. The work is unnecessar-
ily bulky, diffuse, and discursive, at the same time that the penchant for 
system making and symmetry gives it an air of completeness and defini-
tiveness which is not borne out by substantial results. The concept of indi-
vidual psychology is in much the same case as his economics: it is some-
what behind the times; its outlook over its field is narrow, and is subject to 
essentially mechanical limitations; With respect to economic psychology, 
reading Tarde leads to the doubtful conclusion that individual human mo-
tivation is an adequate explanatory tool for the study of Economics. .  
(b) Why is the Tardian contribution to the formation of 
Schumpeter’s ideas neglected? In our view, it is because the German (non-
Marxist) tradition in economics was practically represented by 
Schumpeter, i.e. Vienna’s enfant terrible, a fact that made him appear 
exceptionally unique. Schumpeter played a role in this process, by not 
emphasizing the significant contribution of other theoreticians or schools 
of thoughts, e.g. German Economics (Reinert, 2002). In other words, 
Schumpeter’s originality in the Anglo-American world was, at least partly, 
the product of ignorance of the approaches on which he built his essays.  
According to Toye (2006, 830): “There are different kinds of debt 
that a young economist incurs in the course of his education and appren-
ticeship. Some are personal, accumulated through receiving mentoring, 
friendship and academic patronage, and some are intellectual, accumu-
lated through inspiration, intellectual guidance and assimilation of the 
other’s ideas”. In this context, there is no doubt that Schumpeter owed in-
tellectual debt to Gabriel Tarde.  
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